The Reason of Rhetoric

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ABSTRACT

In this article, it is argued that the rationality of rhetoric is fundamental to it. Such a vision may be found in the humanist tradition but also in the practical dimension of the Greek *techne*. In light of this view, rhetoric must be seen both as an anthropology of speech and as the ground of society.

KEYWORDS: Humanism, practical rationality, Perelman, phronesis, anthropology of speech

INTRODUCTION

Paying more attention to the rhetorical side of argumentation raises epistemological questions. In this article I argue that rhetoric has to be an integral part of argumentative models if such models are to be considered rational. In other words, I claim that rhetoric is a necessary condition for argumentation studies. I am aware that this view may appear provocative. I hope to show that it is not the case, if we consider rationality to be a concept that encompasses more than just a strictly logical way of thinking. Indeed, I would like to defend a humanistic conception of rationality as the background for a theory of rhetoric in order to underscore the specific rationality of the humanist frame of thinking for a given conception of rhetoric, even if it has become marginal in recent centuries. In Western academia, and especially in many American and Canadian models of argumentation, the dominant view today is to “accept” rhetoric if (and only if) it may explicitly be related to philosophy and/or logic. It is the case for Douglas Walton’s
model of argumentation (2010), who recently acknowledged a rhetorical dimension in his traditional approach to informal logic. It is also the case in the pragma-dialectical model developed by the Amsterdam school (Van Eemeren 2010), which decided a couple of years ago to integrate a “strategic maneuvering” dimension in its classical study of argumentative discourse in order to facilitate rhetorical uses of it. These theories may be described as “philosophical” models of argumentation even if each of them bears similarities to other disciplines (either logic or pragmatics). In any case, the authors start from an ideal philosophical model of argumentation that is, implicitly or explicitly, inspired by Plato’s view of rhetoric. As a consequence, rhetoric is always an afterthought in such theories, represented as some kind of indirect, and consequently less rational, way to debate in the public sphere.

There is, however, a humanistic model for rhetoric, which was developed in Italy by Giambattista Vico and modernized in the twentieth century by Ernesto Grassi with the publication in 1980 of his Rhetoric as Philosophy. If humanism is also a philosophical way to understand the uses of rhetoric, I think it nevertheless has a considerable advantage over “idealistic” models. In a humanist model of argumentation, rhetoric is never an afterthought; it is seen as integral to public discourses. The humanist model obliges the researcher to understand argumentation as being rhetorical per se and to not treat rhetoric as a “deviation” from a supposed pure or literal way of speaking and debating. The main difference between the idealistic and the humanist models as far as rhetoric is concerned lies therefore in their respective, radically different conceptions of rationality.

Moreover, the humanistic tradition in rhetoric is highly important for my claim, because it helps me to link rhetoric directly with two other disciplines. The first one is the anthropology of speech that has influenced philosophers like George Kennedy (1998) and Pierre Aubenque (1963), who are directly inspired by Aristotle. The second discipline is the “technique” or the “art” (techne) (more precisely, craft), that is, a practical discipline, that was the first epistemological and political model in which Greek rhetoric was conceived. Here, I draw on the work of Jean-Pierre Vernant and Richard Sennett.

I begin by shedding critical light on normative models in order to underline, step by step, the specific rationality of the humanist tradition of understanding rhetorical phenomena.
CHRISTOPHER TINDALE’S HUMANISTIC CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVE MODELS

Let us first begin with a criticism of the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation. As far as I know, Christopher Tindale’s approach is the most honest and the most clever. In “Constrained Maneuvering: Rhetoric as a Rational Enterprise” (2006), he develops important arguments against those normative models, choosing to expose the underlying conception of rhetoric in the strategic maneuvering element of the pragma-dialectic conception. He first reminds us that the normative model claims that “effective persuasion must be disciplined by dialectical rationality” (2006, 449). In other words, effectiveness, namely, rhetoric’s norms, should be dependent on reasonableness, that is, dialectical criteria. As Tindale puts it, such a relation between rhetoric and dialectic assumes that dialectic plays the role of a gatekeeper, judging whether rhetorical strategies remain within the bounds of rationality. According to Tindale, this rationality criterion directly implies a conception of audience, and, in particular, the conception of a universal audience. He points out that the universal audience, developed in Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s *The New Rhetoric* (1969), was considered relativist from a normative viewpoint. But he underlines the fact that in the *Treatise* the authors are interested in “how hearers experience argumentation” (2006, 454). Moreover, it seems that this experience has always something to do with the way an audience “feels,” that it is through feeling that we initially access argumentation. This emphasis on feeling is very important because it allows me to establish a link with the humanist conception of rationality that I am defending. Indeed, against an overly Cartesian conception of reason, one may argue that the universal audience should find a common ground in a common sense that is shared by the whole humanity. But in order to make this argument, we must first go back to the rational core of this common-sense idea. Indeed, we must better understand the specific rationality that grounds the idea of a common sense if we want to shed light on “effectiveness” and on the question of audience adherence and hence of persuasion, understood differently from manipulation. Tindale’s argument is in my view as courageous as it is realistic: “Real audiences are made up of people in whom reason is not separated from other human faculties” (2006, 461–62). These faculties, I claim, are as definitional of humanity as rationality. If this is so, then we must assume that argumentation without rhetoric is “nonhuman” in two different senses.
First, it is not *human*, because it is not realistic, that is, it does not describe actual human rationality. Second, it is not *humanist* because it does not trust that human beings have the skills to ground rationality in public debates. Such an idealistic viewpoint necessarily grounds its rationality in transcendental criteria, that is, criteria that are rational *because* they are “nonhuman.”

**THE DEFIANCE OF MODERNITY TOWARD HUMANISM**

In order to develop my argument, I first try to explain why the humanistic model for argumentation theory was abandoned, drawing on Bryan Garsten’s *Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgement* to highlight the epistemological and political reasons for modernity’s idealistic choice against the humanistic one for public debate.1 Secondly, I turn back to the humanistic model for rhetoric developed by Giambattista Vico in the late Renaissance in Italy. I then develop my own arguments in defense of a contemporary practical model of rhetoric. My argument is built on the fact that, paradoxically, such a model is the only one that will “save” the rationality of rhetoric in the process of “saving persuasion.” Far from being relativist, this practical model must be considered as the warrant of rationality in the public sphere. In other words, if we want to save the *reason of rhetoric* we must integrate the practical dimension of the model at the core of the activity and perhaps go a step further than the Aristotelian technical model. But let us first go back to modernity’s rejection of a practical conception of rhetoric.

Bryan Garsten lays out his hypothesis as to why modernity renounced practical rhetoric in the introduction of his book:

> The book aims to show how deeply the early modern attack on classical rhetoric influenced the social contract tradition in political thought and how it continues to influence contemporary theories of public reasoning indebted to that tradition. The modern suspicion of rhetoric arose, I suggest, from a crisis of confidence about citizens’ capacity to exercise practical judgement in public deliberations. (2006, 4)

The author directly sheds light on two important aspects of the problem: the (lack of) confidence in citizens’ rationality and, especially, a suspicion about the worth of the practical dimension of rationality in human judgment and decision making. However, he reminds us that the traditional model for rhetoric was especially designed to carry out this practical function in
public life. “Persuasion is one of the characteristic activities of democratic politics,” he notes, and

the study of persuasion, or the art of rhetoric, was for this reason thought to be a fundamental part of a democratic citizen’s education throughout much of Western history. In ancient Athens and Rome, in medieval schools and Renaissance cities, in early modern Europe and nineteenth-century America, both scholars and statesmen taught their students that a well-functioning republican polity required citizens who could articulate arguments on either side of controversy, link those arguments to the particular opinions and prejudices of their fellow citizens, and thereby facilitate the arguing and deliberating that constituted a healthy political life. (2006, 3)

Here is the problem: the need to exercise rhetoric gives rise to the consciousness of the essential “twofold” nature of argumentation. Indeed, when one practices rhetoric, one experiences the fact that, for a given debate, one may always argue for and against the claim that is being debated. From an idealistic point of view, this leads to a double danger. First of all, exercising twofold arguments (i.e., the traditional dissoi logoi) may lead to the kind of epistemological relativism that was denounced by Plato. Second, these practices may lead to political conflict since they reveal various points of view among citizens. Such a variety, from Plato’s viewpoint, always reveals an error or a manipulation. But as Garsten reminds us, rhetoric is a tool for political judgment and not for idealistic philosophy. In this sense, rhetoric is a form of rule (2006, 6), a form of rule that has to do with practical reason or practical wisdom (i.e., phronesis in Aristotle) and not with logic. The rules guiding practical wisdom are, Garsten adds, directly connected with common sense. Consequently, these rules have to be experienced by practicing them and cannot be given a priori in a set of theoretical principles. Here we have to admit that such a conception of rationality, one that defines the phronimos in the tradition, is far from our modern conception of rationality, judgment, and decision making. Rhetoric was a technique and even a craft through which the citizen developed a kind of agility that is directly technical:

Experts in a techne were usually judged on their success in producing the product of their craft. What did rhetoric produce? One answer would be that it produced persuasion in the audience. This is the definition that Gorgias accepts in Plato’s dialogue. Aristotle offered
a different definition. He claimed that the goal of rhetoric was not to persuade but rather to observe the available means of persuasion in any particular case. Even before introducing this definition, he had argued at the beginning of the work that the function of a techne was to observe the causes of success in a practice. (2006, 130)

These definitions raise a question about the function of rhetoric. Contrary to the modern stereotype inherited from Plato, the function of rhetoric is not to persuade but to observe, in each case, the best means by which to achieve persuasion (Rhetoric 1356a). In other words, an excellent orator is very good observation even if it is always possible that the goal will not be reached and, consequently, it is always possible that the audience will not be persuaded. This is not a minor detail. In this difference of interpretation lies the whole practical rationality that was represented by the ancient ideal of humanism embodied in the phronimos of the Aristotelian tradition. Indeed, a wise man knows that knowing the causes of success is no guarantee that one will succeed, but, despite this uncertainty, he acts confidently and proudly. Such a wise man symbolizes practical reason and stands in stark opposition to the Platonic ideal of reason and therefore the conception of rhetoric that I defend here.

Moreover, a certain satisfaction derived from the quality of work accompanies the practice of practical reason, as is the case in the whole craftwork culture (see Sennett 2010). A good orator is a good craftsman, and his goal is to learn by observation of the best means of persuading an audience. As Garsten puts it, “In giving students of rhetoric this intellectual ambition, Aristotle offered them a goal outside the gratification of their audiences and internal to the practice of rhetoric itself. He suggested that rhetoric could be mastered as a techne only insofar as it had such a goal” (2006, 130).

The foregoing suggests that in order to capture the whole practical dimension of its rationality in the public sphere, we must pay more attention to the reality of rhetorical “functions.”

Rhetoric as an Anthropology of Speech

Accepting that there is a difference between persuading and discovering the means by which to persuade provides the criterion for considering rhetoric as an anthropology of speech, even in studies that are not to be limited to linguistic and discursive phenomena. The idea of an anthropology of speech allows the researcher to establish a rational link between discursive

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phenomena, human institutions, and political functions. Such a link, we may assume, grounds the definition of rhetorical genres. Garsten explains how Aristotle drew on the functions of audiences as he understood it to arrive at the genres of rhetoric:

Aristotle began by laying out a schema that included the roles that audience members were most likely to play when listening. They might be acting as observers or they might be judging matters that had occurred in the past or wondering which course of action to take in the future. That is, listeners could be spectators, jurors, or deliberators in an assembly. Thus the three types of rhetoric—epideictic, judicial, and deliberative—arose from sorting listeners by their functions. (2006, 132)

If we understand the question of genres through the framework of an anthropology of speech, the key word in theory for the uses of rhetoric becomes “function.” As in any anthropological description, the question of function is always related to our conception of rationality. In other words, to the question of why citizens try to persuade with respect to those features that are definitional of a genre (role of the listener, type of argument, specificity of an institution) the answer is always because citizens assume that this way is the most useful for their various institutions. In such a functional and technical conception of rhetorical speech, utility is then always related to rationality. It is also George Kennedy’s viewpoint in his comparative study of rhetoric, a study that can be considered to have provided the basis for an anthropology of speech. Indeed, Kennedy compares the uses of rhetoric in many cultures and traditions and shows that the three Aristotelian genres have a permanent presence in human societies. In sum, human beings have a limited set of skills with which to persuade audiences when they are engaged in the building of a common society, and the functions of hearers and speakers are always at the core of the reflection.

Moreover, we must assume that this conception of rationality, which is respectful of human—anthropological—reality, can help us better understand the role of the “spectator,” that is, the citizen who “observes” (“theoresai”) the best ways to persuade in a given situation. This act of observation is not purely contemplative and passive. It grounds the practical rationality that is necessary for the citizen in order to use rhetoric in the public sphere. Hence, the rational role of the spectator is crucial in an anthropology of speech.4
This now leads me one step further in my demonstration: the rational role of rhetoric is itself built on the political function of the spectator and his counterpart, the poet, in its archaic political function. In his critique of the Kantian and the Cartesian conceptions of rationality, motivated by his desire to reconcile our vision of rationality with the humanist tradition, Ernesto Grassi claims that the political function of the poet is no less than the building of a society with “words and works” (2001, 71–72). He then argues in defense of the humanist rhetorical tradition, which implies a political conception of rhetoric:

The problem confronting us is that our rationalistic scientific ideal of knowledge equates the rigor of objective thought with the provable and excludes every form of figurative, poetic, metaphorical, and rhetorical language from the theoretical sphere. From this fact three questions arise: (1) whether such an exclusion is legitimate; (2) what is the importance of a tradition like the humanistic one, whether we accept or reject it, that is based upon the assertion of the primacy of figurative language as the source of the historicity characteristic of human beings; and (3) the problem of whether the questions and theories of the humanist tradition permit overcoming the purely logical and “formalist” character of contemporary thought. (2001, 76)

RHETORIC AS THE GROUND OF SOCIETY

By dismissing the rejection of the humanist tradition as illegitimate, Grassi claims, like other writers cited, that we have to admit that rhetoric is always first among rational phenomena and never a supplement. He even claims that rhetoric is at “the ground of society” (2001, 68–101). If we admit such a viewpoint, which remains marginal today but is at the core of the humanist tradition, it behooves us to develop the quasi-genetic links that are thereby established between rhetoric and rationality. In addition, all these authors share a vision of rhetoric as a discipline that is both practical and political. Those two characteristics may in part explain the fact that in this conception, rhetoric is essential to political life because its first and main function is to “humanize” nature by producing and sharing expressions of it.

This is perhaps the principal aspect of a humanist conception of rhetoric. Indeed, when Grassi claims that rhetoric is “the ground of society,” he
evokes the humanist tradition from Dante to Vico, namely, a tradition in which rhetoric fulfills an important rational and political function: producing “figures” of the world in order that citizens may share a common representation of this world. This conception of figure is nevertheless far from relativism. On the contrary, figures are at the same time a condition of ethics and a condition of rationality.

To better establish this position, I propose to go back to an important notion in Aristotle’s thought: sunaisthesis.5 The current translation for this concept is “conscience,” but this reveals the epistemological gap between the Aristotelian conception of rationality and its modern version, especially as it is inherited by Descartes. What Aristotle called sunaisthesis is the human capacity to feel that one feels, to put together sensations and emotions, but also to interact with others by sharing (discursive) representations of this common feeling. In other words, as an ancient version of the modern conscience, sunaisthesis is the human capacity to experience the common sense. Over the course of the centuries between Aristotle to Descartes, human rationality went from being conceived in sensualist naturalist terms (sentio ergo sum) to being conceived in dualist rationalist terms (cogito ergo sum) (see Heller-Roazen 2007). But the humanist tradition tries to reconcile a vision of humanity in which sharing sensations and emotions is at the core of rationality.

We now come to the political dimension of the rhetorical function to “figure,” that is, to produce a representation of the world, to share a common sense but also to deliberate in public life. The Aristotelian politicon zoon is precisely the one who is able to exercise common sense in order to observe and to find (theoresai) the best means to persuade when deliberating.6

Grassi proposes a provocative hypothesis: language and rhetoric primarily have a “religious” function (2001, 102–14). But we may acknowledge that this “religion” literally (religio) corresponds to the ethical and political function of the Aristotelian sunaisthesis, which may be a condition of civil concord (homonoia). In sunaisthesis, to experience and to exercise a common sense together is an important condition. In other words, if there is any chance of warranting a civil concord it will be only in experiencing all those rhetorical practices. Hence, this conception of rhetoric is necessarily practical and not theoretical. It is necessarily first and not derived from an ideal model. The religious function that Grassi sees in rhetoric is nothing other than the human “ritual” that consists of dialogue (and sometimes debate) with one another. In sum, dialogues and deliberations that are at the core of any democracy are possible thanks the exercise of “feeling together,”
namely, of sharing a common sense. This corresponds to a humanist conception of rationality that designates rhetoric as the principal tool.

RHETORIC AS A CRAFTWORK FOR EXERCISING HUMANITY

Let us now go back to the practical dimension of rhetoric in order to better understand the role of craftwork in this conception of rhetoric. I consider the epistemological consequences of the integration of this “technical” specificity of rhetoric into our contemporary models. In this inquiry into a humanist conception of rhetoric, we have considered some important human skills that are useful in building a common world and that correspond to the “religious” function of rhetoric outlined by Grassi. These skills consist of feeling, expressing, telling, deliberating, and so forth; in other words, they are a set of skills that together compose the art of rhetoric. But at this stage it is important to insist on the fact that these skills are not acquired theoretical expertises but acquired practical experiences. Hence, their rationality is only revealed in the practical framework of the rhetorical techne where citizens are used to practicing those skills as any craftsman does. In this respect Richard Sennett’s book on craftwork is very useful in shedding an a posteriori light on rhetoric as seen from this perspective, even if Sennett does not actually evoke rhetoric. He insists that it is the fact that the craftsman is patiently engaged in a rational practice over a long period of time that allows the him (here, the citizen) to develop an ability that will become second nature. Garsten’s considerations of rhetoric may be understood from this perspective: the craftsman in rhetoric develops a second nature while exercising his skills as a citizen. From an epistemological viewpoint, a second nature is more holistic than epistemic knowledge—a “knowing that.” It is a global, anthropological knowledge: a “knowing how.” It is thus through the practical model of craftwork that we become aware of the actual rationality of rhetoric. Far from being either relativist or idealist, rhetoric is rational because it is practical. The knowing how of the orator-citizen craftsman is acquired by exerting cognitive, discursive, gestural, emotional skills, and moreover, by exerting them together with other citizens. In opposition modern thought’s skepticism about human skills, the craftsman culture develops confidence and trust in one’s ability to react in the face of uncertainty. This ability is perhaps common to all craftsmen, as is claimed by Sennett. But there is one technique that is
specific to rhetoric and that, I think, we must consider as rational in the sense that I defend here.

As Garsten argues, dissoi logoi—twofold arguments—were an important technique in societies that taught rhetoric to citizens. But Garsten does not insist enough on the link between rationality and practical reason in this exercise. Kimber Charles Pearce (1994), however, reflects interestingly on this specific link in the teaching of dissoi logoi. Indeed, according to him, such a practice, understood as a practice and not as a theory, has to be preserved as an efficient method for discovering the means of persuasion (theoresai), to train the “invention” skill, that is necessary in rhetoric: “Dissoi logoi offers a holistic method for teaching invention that can be used to encourage students’ rhetorical sensitivity to race, class, gender, and different ideologies to prepare them to meet multiple demands of group discourse in the larger context of a diverse society” (1994, 9).

Here, the very important link appears between invention as a knowing how and sensitivity as a second nature developed by the exercise of it. Pearce even argues that such a method is more useful today than in ancient Greece because of the multicultural reality of our democratic societies. In other words, tolerance is developed as a skill and not as an abstract principle.

Shedding light on the practical nature of this skill is the key to seeing that its rationality lies in its efficiency. This is the ethical side of the method. But, according to Pearce, such a practice also develops creativity and imagination—other skills necessary for a good orator: “By examining contradictory truths, a student must seek to know more about the issue on which he or she has chosen to speak. Through that process of invention, a student gains a better sense of his or her own position in relation to the issue, and is allowed to alter that position if he or she sees fit” (1994, 22). In sum, exerting dissoi logoi furnishes a useful method by which the citizen can become more confident, more tolerant, and more imaginative. Rhetoric is a set of tools that allows a citizen to develop an important knowing how, that is, phronesis (practical wisdom). Moreover, as Jean-Pierre Vernant (1965) points out in his discussion of technical culture, the very value of such skills lies in their use. I think that we must face the fact that behind this value lies an efficiency that is a condition of rationality. I am aware that such a position appears marginal and even provocative. But I think that this is the lesson from the humanist tradition in rhetoric that we need to remember and even to rebuild today.
CONCLUSION: PERELMAN AND THE UNIVERSAL AUDIENCE, A HUMANIST LECTURE

Finally, in order to illustrate my position, I would like to propose a humanist and practical account of the well-known “problem” of Perelman’s universal audience. The famous Perelmanian concept of the universal audience has been the object of much discussion. Most of the time, comments about it sway between two opposing positions.

For many normative models, the concept of universal audience runs the risk of collapsing into moral and epistemological relativism. This fear arises from a lack of confidence in human skills, and hence, in audiences in general. From this viewpoint, a universal audience, which is in fact the sum of particular audiences, must not be trusted in the public sphere. Indeed, from a Platonic viewpoint, a set of various viewpoints in a public debate reveals necessarily an error of judgment, precisely because a variety of viewpoints is not compatible with truth. From a Platonic perspective, agreement may be seen as the criterion of truth. Hence, disagreement is not a political matter but the epistemic sign of an error. Therefore, the multiplicity of audiences always threatens concord and poses a risk of discord. In my view, the normative approach reduces the political criterion—that is, concord—to the rhetorical criterion—that is, agreement.

For other authors, Perelman is, on the contrary, too authoritarian; in their view, his concept of a universal audience evokes the philosophical Kantian category of universality, a category that is too abstract to capture the reality of debates (see, e.g., Cassin 1995).

I think that both interpretations miss the specific rationality of the universal audience because both interpretations approach the problem in strictly theoretical terms: they do not consider the importance of practical reason in this specific problem. As Grassi points out, practical reason challenges the whole of the speculative tradition. “Usus” and “experimentia” replace the a priori idea: the question of the existential claim replaces the problem of causal, rational thought; the investigation of the world as the correspondence of the existential claim takes the place of the rational definition of being; the assertion of the preeminence of metaphoric language over rational language is maintained. (1988, 121)
However, it should be acknowledged that Perelman himself did not appear to be aware of all these consequences. He seems to move between a relativist and an idealist conception of the universal audience, even if, inspired by his rhetorical model for practical reason, he often expresses a wish to rebuild humanism (see Perelman 1990). I propose to save the concept of universal audience by drawing on the humanist viewpoint for rhetoric that I have developed here. I think that we must admit that the concept of universal audience belongs to the set of tools that are useful in rhetoric, especially for public debates. When citizens refer to a “universal audience” or something like the “conscience of everyman” (as Perelman often paraphrases his concept), they simply refer to their experience of sunaisthesis: the capacity to feel and to act together in the public sphere. They thus experience their capacity to persuade each other by seeing and discovering (theoresai) the best way to realize this action. And the best way is to experience together a common sense that trains the conscience to be a citizen: a politicon zoon. Such an experience may be qualified as “religious” in Grassi’s sense of the word, but it is more or less what the Greek tradition called homonoia: concord.

Finally, a new humanistic conception of rhetoric argues for a new definition of rationality. To be honest, this definition is not at all new but tries to recover from the Greek conception of rationality some useful but lost criteria. As I have argued, on the Greek conception, the reason of rhetoric is practical, sensitive, and collective. It is practical because it is grounded in the craftsman culture. It is thus very important to see rhetoric as a techne and not as a philosophy and to admit all the consequences of this viewpoint. It is sensitive because human reason is necessarily grounded in shared sensations and emotions. Far from avoiding the use of those skills, it is rationale to learn to use them. It is collective because in using rhetoric we are using discursive skills that give us the best chance of building concord or at least a society that is not characterized by excessive conflict.

It is perhaps not unreasonable to imagine that such an exercise of practical reason allows every citizen to develop a second nature, as in craftsmanship. In the public sphere, this second nature may be the capacity to “feel together” and to “experience this feeling.” But if we want to trust this option we must decide to trust the capacity of humankind to humanize the word. To decide to trust human beings on this front is perhaps unrealistic. But do we really have the choice?

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1. One may find a more complete development of these arguments in Danblon 2013.

2. The Greek verb for “observe” is “theoresai” (the medium voice, from “theorein” in the active voice) and is sometimes translated by “see” (Tindale 2004) or “discover” (“découvrir” in the French translation; see Aristotle 1967). This activity is more an experience than an expertise.

3. Indeed, other actional and emotional skills must be taken into account in the art of rhetoric.

4. Concerning the anthropologic function of the epideictic genre, see Pratt 2012. See also Danblon 2013, 88ff.

5. For an account of sunaisthesis, see Heller-Roazen 2007.

6. Concerning the link between exercises and rhetorical figures and their function in public life, see Webb 2009.

7. For such a useful distinction, see Ryle 1963.

8. For a clever reflection on the subject, see also Crosswhite 2010.

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